Theory of Mind and Social Competence

Devine & Apperly published “Willing and able? Theory of mind, social motivation, and social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence” (2021) in Developmental Science. 

Let me begin with part of their research summary:

Understanding why children differ from one another in their ability to build, manage, and maintain social relationships (or “social competence”) in middle childhood and early adolescence matters: poor social competence in middle childhood predicts later mental health difficulties, poorer academic outcomes, and even difficulties in work (Bornstein et al., 2010; Burt et al., 2008). 

Theory of mind (TOM) research asserts that children usually have a basic understanding of beliefs and desires by about age 5.  However, there are conflicting views of the place of TOM in relation to social competence, with Apperly (2012) predicting that superior TOM performance benefits social competence over and above any influence of general cognitive factors (e.g., language, executive function), while Astington (2003) sees individual differences in TOM as relating to  general cognitive processes and not to social competence.

Their second interest lies in social motivation, noting that: 

Several studies point to reduced social motivation among children, adolescents, and adults with autism. . . . For example, adolescents with autism report lower levels of social interest (measured using self-reported pleasure in social situations) than neurotypical adolescents (Chevallier, Grèzes, et al., 2012). Data from adults (aged 18–65) indicate that self-reported difficulties with social communication and interaction are negatively associated with enjoyment of social interaction and admiration from others (Foulkes et al., 2015). 

They studied 264 children 8-13 years old in England who were socioeconomically and ethnically diverse: 24.2% spoke languages in addition to English at home and 15.9% received Free School Meals. They used measures of TOM (the Strange Stories and Silent Film tasks) and social motivation. I am providing the descriptions of the latter because they are quite interesting:

The Pleasure Scale for Children (Kazdin, 1989) measured individual differences in pleasure derived from social interactions. The seven-item Child Preference for Solitude Questionnaire (Coplan et al.,2013) captured differences in children's interest in social interactions. The Social Achievement Goals questionnaire (Rudolph et al., 2011) captured children's social goal orientation. 

Children also completed both the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (Rust, 2008) to measure verbal ability and the Spatial Working Memory test to measure executive function. Teachers measured high-level social competence using the Peer Social Maturity Scale (Peterson et al., 2007) and basic social impairment with the Childhood Autism Syndrome Test (CAST) (Ronald et al., 2008).

Here are some critical findings:

First, there were unique associations between individual differences in theory of mind and social competence across middle childhood and early adolescence. Second, there were specific associations between children's theory of mind ability and variation in social motivation, specifically children's willingness to build and maintain social relationships. Third, despite partial overlap, both children's theory of mind ability and their willingness to build and maintain social relationships made unique contributions to high-level social competence.

Basic social and communication skills are likely to form the foundation of co-operation with others, but the overlap between these facets of social competence may not be due to theory of mind. . . . The strength of the association between theory of mind and social competence did not vary between ages 8 and 13. The consistency of the link between theory of mind and social competence across middle childhood and early adolescence can be interpreted in at least two ways. One possibility is that theory of mind supports the construction or further development of high-level social interaction skills beyond early childhood. Alternatively, mindreading abilities may be intrinsic to social interaction skills even in adolescence and adulthood (Apperly et al., 2009). . . . We found little overlap between self-reported pleasure in social activities, interest in social situations, desire to gain social approval and avoid negative social judgment, and willingness to build and maintain social relationships. This is consistent with prior work (e.g., Rudolph et al., 2011) and suggests that measures of “social motivation” capture distinct constructs. . . . We found a modest but unique association between children's theory of mind and their willingness to build and maintain social relationships. This supports the view that individual differences in theory of mind cannot be viewed purely as an index of theory-of-mind capacity but instead may reflect in part a willingness to expend effort reasoning about social situations (e.g., Contreras-Huerta et al., 2020). While there was some degree of overlap between theory of mind and social motivation, both ability and willingness made unique contributions to individual differences in children's social competence. 

The association between theory of mind and children's willingness to build and maintain social relationships raises interesting questions about the developmental relations between ability and motivation. One possibility is that children's willingness to build and maintain social relationships emerges as a result of their developing insights into others’ minds. An alternative possibility is that social motivation drives the development of children's theory of mind. That is, children who find social interactions pleasurable may be more willing to expend effort in building and maintaining social relationships and as a consequence pay greater attention to the minds of others (Dawson et al., 2004).